Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts:
On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
Issues:
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.
Held:
1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
Issues:
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.
Held:
1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
Case Digest: People vs Nazario
Facts:
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto
Held:
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated “Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty
The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto
Held:
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated “Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty
The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
From Essay to Multiple Choice: What is your take on the changes in the Philippine BAR Exams?
I'm sure you have already heard that starting in 2011, the Philippine Bar Exams will be changing from a purely essay type of exam to a 60-40 division of Multiple Choice type of exam and essay. The change came about to much surprise of the whole student body as essay and multiple choice kinds of exams are very different. Some differences would be the shorter time to check the exams. Multiple choice exams are easier to check and will give the result after only a short time. Much like the way we voted last election, the exam will just be inserted in the machine and then your grade or score will immediately be available. The drawback for this would be that one wrong shade or shading an answer will result in the machine not registering your selection. Also, having multiple choice will limit the chance to be able to defend your answers. It will only be one of two options, either it is correct or it is wrong. There will be no points for effort. Surely the 2011 takers are already worried and tense about this. It is still a year away, but as we draw closer to the BAR exams of 2011, what are your views on the change in exam format? Do you think this is better than the traditional exams? Let's hear your thoughts! Post them in the comment section and let's discuss. :)
Case Digest: Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez
Facts of the Case:
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.
Held:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.
Held:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.
Case Digest: Vera vs Avelino
Facts of the Case:
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
Issues of the Case:
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.
Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections.
Held:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts
The case is therefore dismissed
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
Issues of the Case:
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.
Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections.
Held:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts
The case is therefore dismissed
Case DIgest: Aglipay vs Ruiz
Facts of the Case:
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress
Held:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress
Held:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
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